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Of all the changes that are transforming the Internet, the loss of trust may 
be the most fundamental. . . . [T]he simple model of the early Internet—a 
group of mutually trusting users attached to a transparent network—is gone 
forever.1 
The Internet’s early architecture was built on a foundation of trust. 
From its inception in the 1960s through commercialization in 1993, the 
Internet was a relatively simple network that was designed, constructed, and 
used by a relatively small community of research and governmental institu-
tions with broadly aligned incentives. In the decade following commerciali-
zation, even as these institutions gave way to diverse commercial interests, 
trust remained an organizing principle—the personal ties of technologists and 
their largely shared vision of a technological future drove use, investment, 
and research. 
This trust-based architecture is quickly giving way to a post-trust future, 
however. As the Internet has matured, its architecture, uses, and the 
interests of its architects and users have become increasingly diverse and 
complicated. During the Internet’s early development, a meaningful 
number of its users knew and cared how the Internet worked. They were 
vested in contributing to its development. This is no longer the case. 
Rather, the Internet now facilitates myriad private interests that may or 
may not be aligned with the social interests of the developing Internet 
architecture. 
This transition from the Internet as a community with a common purpose 
to the Internet as a platform that supports myriad, often conflicting, private 
interests is not necessarily a bad thing. Many communities are founded 
with a common purpose that allows their members to rely on informal, 
trust-based mechanisms to respond to, or avoid the need to respond to, 
conflicts. As these communities grow, their informal mechanisms give way 
to more formal ones. It is unsurprising that the Internet would follow a 
similar trajectory.  
This Article considers one of the challenges of this evolution: the role of 
intermediaries’ liability for the harm they cause to users. All online interactions 
 
1 Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End-to-
End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 70, 93 
(2001). 
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are conducted through intermediaries—the routers, servers, applications, 
services, and switches that make up the Internet’s “core.” In the era of the 
trust-based Internet, intermediaries were largely passive participants in the 
technological ecosystem. This limited both the harm they could cause and 
the basis for liability against them. In today’s Internet, intermediaries are 
increasingly active; they make real-time decisions about how to handle user 
data, and they have the ability to store or share that data for private purposes. 
In the post-trust Internet, intermediaries can cause real harm. Without 
trust, it remains unclear which institutions, if any, safeguard users from 
such harm. 
This Article’s focus differs from that of previous work in this area. Many 
scholars have considered the role of liability for Internet intermediaries, but 
their work has generally focused on using intermediaries to redress harms 
caused by users.2 For instance, to what extent should an intermediary be 
considered a speaker for moderating (or not) harmful speech? Or, should 
intermediaries be vicariously or indirectly liable for the illegal acts of users? 
Should payment intermediaries be liable for curtailing certain classes of 
illegal activity? Scholars have previously addressed questions such as these 
when considering intermediary liability. 
As the role of active intermediaries continues to expand, liability for 
harm that intermediaries themselves cause is increasingly significant. There 
are two basic reasons for this. First, users lacking the ability to seek recourse 
may demand that active intermediation not be used. Regulatory and pro-
posed statutory responses to network neutrality and privacy concerns are 
early examples of such demands. If the technology can, in users’ estimation, 
harm them in ways against which they cannot protect themselves, users will 
be reluctant to embrace such technology—even if it is otherwise beneficial.  
Second, the dearth of non–trust based enforcement mechanisms will 
reduce the supply of active intermediation technologies. This is a second-
order effect driven by a lack of demand: if users are unable to hold inter-
mediaries accountable for harms they may cause, users will be less willing to 
 
2 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); 
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1367 (1996); Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221 (2006); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet 
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239 (2005); Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet 
Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213 (2003–2004); Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of 
Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003). Peter Swire’s work is one exception, but this Article’s 
analysis, unlike that of Professor Swire, does not consider the role of intermediaries with respect 
to the viability of bilateral negotiations between users. See generally Peter P. Swire, Trustwrap: The 
Importance of Legal Rules to Electronic Commerce and Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 847 (2003).  
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use those intermediaries’ services. This reduces demand, and therefore will 
reduce the quantity of active intermediation services offered, including 
research and development of new services. 
Both of these problems are rooted in the transition away from trust-
based interactions. In the trust-based Internet, there was little concern that 
active intermediation would be used to users’ detriment. In the post-trust 
Internet, users cannot embrace active intermediaries without assurances that 
their data will be handled in accordance with their expectations. This 
Article argues that the availability of legal recourse plays an important role 
in establishing such assurances, both by providing an avenue of redress 
when expectations are frustrated and by creating incentives to develop 
technologies that enable lower-cost mechanisms to this end. 
Whatever the form taken by the role of liability, its transformation 
complements ongoing efforts to address the concerns generated by active 
intermediation. Both regulation and ongoing technological development 
shape what intermediaries can do as well as what they actually do. But it is 
doubtful that regulation and technology alone can protect users from 
harmful intermediation; adding recourse to the courts may help to advance 
the goal of protecting users from harmful intermediation. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I considers the role of trust in 
the early Internet, how the evolving Internet is moving away from this 
trust-based model, and how the loss of trust affects and limits online 
institutions.  
The Internet is not the only institution that operates without trust. Many 
institutions already operate in such an environment. Part II looks to how 
other institutions function absent trust. These institutions’ approaches fall 
into three categories: vertical integration; reliance on internal mechanisms 
to enable trust-like interactions (e.g., reputation, encryption); and reliance 
on external mechanisms to enable trust-free interactions (e.g., legal institu-
tions).  
Part III considers the limitations and lessons from these standard 
approaches and synthesizes them into a set of principles for establishing 
intermediaries’ liability. Each approach suggests ways that a post-trust 
Internet might operate, but the Internet’s architectural characteristics also 
present certain challenges. The Internet is designed to accommodate myriad 
independent actors, making widespread integration among intermediaries 
unviable. Those intermediaries are also supposed to operate transparently to 
users, which presents additional challenges to legal institutions. These two 
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design principles—independence and transparency3—present fundamental 
technical challenges to any mechanism designed to facilitate interactions 
between parties that do not trust each other.  
The institutional constraints that result from the Internet’s architectural 
characteristics suggest two separate goals for the law: (1) establishing 
liability for intermediaries that may cause harm to users and (2) creating 
incentives to influence the ongoing evolution of underlying technology in 
ways that may overcome these fundamental technical challenges. Part IV 
considers both of these goals and presents a framework to assess which legal 
rules should apply based upon the capabilities of the underlying technology. 
Under this framework, today’s intermediaries would be governed by broad 
liability rules with the burden on intermediaries themselves to prove that 
they have not harmed users. As technology develops, however, this frame-
work may give users greater control over how their data is used, such that 
intermediaries would be better governed by property rules with burdens 
placed on users to control their own data. Such an approach provides 
technologists with a menu of options, enabling them to understand the legal 
consequences that may follow from technical design decisions.  
I. TRUST LOST 
This Part considers three topics: the role of trust in the early Internet, 
how the evolving Internet is moving away from this trust-based model, and 
how the loss of trust affects and limits online institutions.  
A. What is Meant by Trust 
Scholars of various stripes often speak about the role of trust on the 
Internet.4 In this and other areas of scholarship, the term “trust” often goes 
 
3 Blumenthal and Clark’s article captures the role of transparency. See supra note 1, at 93. 
Independence follows from the Internet’s design as an “internetwork” or “network of networks.” 
See generally Brian Carpenter, Architectural Principles of the Internet, (Internet Eng’g Task Force 
(IETF) Network Working Grp., Request for Comments (RFC) No. 1958, 1996), available at 
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc1958.txt.pdf. See also Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, 
The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 819, 878 
(2004) (discussing the centrality of transparency to the Internet); Richard S. Whitt, A Deference 
to Protocol: Fashioning a Three-Dimensional Public Policy Framework for the Internet Age at 
20-26 (Sept. 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing Internet design 
principles including how end-to-end design and connectivity demonstrate independence while 
modularity and layering demonstrate transparency).  
4 See generally Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 1; Ed Gerck, Trust as Qualified Reliance on 
Information, COOK REP. ON INTERNET PROTOCOL, Jan. 2002, at 19; David R. Johnson, Susan P. 
Crawford & John G. Palfrey, Jr., The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internal Governance, 9 
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undefined.5 Despite this trend, it is useful to consider the meaning of trust 
at the outset of this discussion. 
In its most pithy form, this Article takes trust to mean “reliance without 
recourse.” That is, one person trusts another when she relies on that other 
person in a way that exposes her to harm, but does so under circumstances 
where she has no recourse available should that harm come to pass. This 
meaning falls within a core concept of trust common to many authors.6 
More importantly, this definition captures the idea animating most 
discussions of online trust—an intangible and important coordinating 
 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?, 81 
B.U. L. Rev. 635 (2001). 
5  Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 1; David D. Clark et al., Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining 
Tomorrow’s Internet, 13 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS NETWORKING 462 (2005); Johnson et al., 
supra note 4. The greatest exception is those articles that do take the meaning of trust, as opposed 
to the role of trust, as their primary topics. As discussed generally by Rebecca Bratspies, 
In light of the vast number of trees killed to publish psychological, economic, and 
sociological studies on the topic, trust’s continued elusiveness seems surprising. Part 
of the problem may be that the term is used colloquially in many different contexts, 
and researchers from many different fields rely on an intuitive understanding of the 
term. . . . Indeed there is an ongoing debate within scholarly circles over the mean-
ing of the term “trust,” and there is still no consensus definition.  
Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 588-89 (2009); see also Gerck, supra 
note 4, at 21 (noting that “there are also ‘poetic’ or ‘everyday’ uses of the word trust that permeate 
some [computer] security work and Internet communication protocols”); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 453, 463-69 (1993) 
(observing that “‘trust’ is a term with many meanings” and examining the relationship between 
trust and commercial exchange). 
6 See Bratspies, supra note 5, at 589 (identifying scholarly convergence on a definition of trust as 
“a willingness to accept vulnerability under conditions of uncertainty”); L. Jean Camp et al., Trust: A 
Collision of Paradigms (“People’s decisions to trust computers may be affected by their perceptions 
of the difference between computers and humans in error making and acting with guile. It is a 
commonly held belief that computers only replicate human error and that computers can be easily 
monitored to find the source of error. Also, most individuals do not perceive computers are able to 
act with guile.”), in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY: 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, 2001, at 
91, 97 (Paul F. Syverson ed., 2001); Nissenbaum, supra note 4, at 643-46 (warning that without 
sufficient trust in online services, people will be reluctant to make use of such resources in part 
due to the increased exposure to harm); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 555, 
556-58 (2001) (defining trust as “the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another without 
costly external constraints”); see also JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 111 
(1990) (“[I]t is to the trustor’s interest to create social structures in which it is to the potential 
trustee’s interest to be trustworthy, rather than untrustworthy.”); Timothy L. Fort & Liu Junhai, 
Chinese Business and the Internet: The Infrastructure for Trust, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1545, 1551 
(2002) (“Trust always entails at least one party being vulnerable to the actions of another, and that 
party therefore depends upon, relies on, or trusts the other party not to exploit that vulnerability.”); 
Russell Hardin, The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust, 21 POL. & SOC’Y 505, 505 (1993) (“[Y]ou 
trust someone if you have adequate reason to believe it will be in that person's interest to be 
trustworthy in the relevant way at the relevant time.”). 
  
2013] Trust and Online Interaction 1585 
 
principle that facilitated interactions on the early Internet, but one that is 
decreasingly viable as a coordinating principle today. Trust was the factor 
that, in the “simple model of the early Internet,” allowed “a group of 
mutually trusting users attached to a transparent network” to work as a 
community toward the common goal of developing the network—and this is 
the thing that “is gone forever.”7 In the early iteration of the Internet as 
described by David Clark, users could rely on one another without fear of 
being harmed; they had no need to consider whether avenues of recourse 
were available. Similarly, users were sufficiently aware of the relatively 
simple network’s operational principles so that they did not fear harm from 
the network itself.  
However, as the network has grown in complexity and as users’ interests 
have grown more diverse, the possibility of harm has grown as well. As 
harm has become a concern, so too has the need for protection from that 
harm. Absent the availability of recourse against such harms, users must 
alter their behavior to protect against them.  
Trust is therefore a variable on two sides of an equation. Users’ trust in 
the Internet affects their willingness to rely on the Internet. The extent of 
that trust mirrors their ability to secure recourse against harm: recourse 
increases users’ willingness to accept the risk of incurring those harms. 
Increasing trust decreases the need for available avenues of recourse, while 
decreasing trust decreases the extent to which users will rely on the Internet 
if there is no offsetting increase in the reach of available recourse. 
B. The Early Internet 
The early Internet was developed by a small community of researchers with 
a common goal: to make the technology work.8 Protocols and applications were 
 
7 Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 1, at 93; see also J. Kempf & R. Austein, The Rise of the Mid-
dle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture 6 (IETF 
Network Working Grp. RFC No. 3724, 2004), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/pdfrfc/ 
rfc3724.txt.pdf (“Blumenthal and Clark . . . make the point that the Internet originally developed 
among a community of like-minded technical professionals who trusted each other, and was 
administered by academic and government institutions who enforced a policy of no commercial 
use. The major stakeholders in the Internet are quite different today.”); Christopher S. Yoo, 
Beyond Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2189, 2213 (2012) 
(“Commentators widely recognize that the universe of Internet users can no longer be character-
ized as the type of ‘close-knit community’ needed for social norms to arise.”). 
8 See Internet Governance Not Scaling Well, 6 COOK REP. ON INTERNET PROTOCOL, Sept. 
1997, at 1, 1 (“In the 1970s and 80s American researchers developed a technology to support the 
functioning of an arcane computer network. It was a small community where everyone knew each 
other. For twenty five years it did things with a hand shake and a documentation system that 
supported a rough consensus of its engineers as the direction in which to push further development. 
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developed to accomplish technical ends without thought to securing them 
against malicious use. In general, the idea that the technology had to be 
secured against such misuse was secondary, if present at all.9 The reason for 
this is simple: while such misuse could happen, there was no concern it that 
would happen. 
This mentality thrived—and helped the Internet thrive—throughout 
most of its early history. The scale of the network aided this mentality. 
Throughout most of the 1980s, there were fewer hosts connected to the 
entire Internet than computers connected to the internal networks of many 
companies today.10 By the late 1980s, there were only a few hundred 
networks connected to the Internet backbone, then operated by the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) as NSFNET.11 Any problems that occurred 
could be handled by individuals who knew each other professionally and 
sometimes even socially.12 
Similarly, the Internet’s early technology and architecture were simpler. 
Most of the Internet’s history has been dominated by two basic types of 
applications: data transfer and text-based interactive communication. These 
applications have relatively straightforward technical requirements, and 
 
They called it the Internet.”); see also KAREN D. FRAZER, NSFNET: A PARTNERSHIP FOR 
HIGH-SPEED NETWORKING, FINAL REPORT (1987-1995) at 20-26 (1996), available at http:// 
www.merit.edu/documents/pdf/nsfnet/nsfnet_report.pdf (detailing the history behind the creation 
of a national backbone service). 
9 Security has often been an afterthought in the development of new technology. See, e.g., 
United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the 1988 Morris Worm where 
“[t]he goal of this program was to demonstrate the inadequacies of current security measures”); 
W. Eddy, TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations 2 (IETF Network Working Grp. 
RFC No. 4987, 2007), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc4987.txt.pdf (“The TCP 
SYN flooding weakness was discovered as early as 1994. . . . Unfortunately, no countermeasures 
were developed within the next two years.”); KEMPF & AUSTEIN, supra note 7, at 6 (“Because the 
end users in the Internet of 15 years ago were few, and were largely dedicated to using the Internet 
as a tool for academic research and communicating research results[,] . . . trust between end users 
. . . and between network operators and their users was simply not an issue in general.”); see also 
Ashwin Jacob Mathew & Coye Cheshire, The New Cartographers: Trust and Social Order 
Within the Internet Infrastructure (2002) (unpublished manuscript),  available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988216 (“Since network administrators often knew one 
another personally, and trusted their peers . . . there was no need anticipated for security in the 
protocol.”); Tim Moors, A Critical Review of “End-to-End Arguments in System Design” (2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2.ee.unsw.edu.au/~timm/pubs/02icc/published. 
pdf (discussing congestion, “it is naive in today’s commercial Internet to expect end-points to act 
altruistically”). 
10 Internet Host Count History, INTERNET SYSTEMS CONSORTIUM, https://www.isc.org/ 
solutions/survey/history (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
11 See FRAZER, supra note 8, at 25 (noting that in 1988, there were approximately 170 networks 
connected online); see also id. at 5 (noting that there were 217 networks connected in July of 1988).  
12 See Mathew & Cheshire, supra note 9, at 9-12 (“The social groups . . . were tightly knit.”). 
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neither is extremely sensitive to minor variations in performance: where 
problems did arise, they could be addressed by simply increasing the 
capacity of congested links.13 At the same time, the architecture of the early 
Internet was relatively simple. As of 1988, for example, the NSF provided a 
single, nationwide Internet backbone that interconnected regional networks 
at a small number of network access points.14 This presented a straightfor-
ward, hierarchical model of the Internet—one that remained dominant 
during the Internet’s commercialization in 1993 and transition away from 
NSFNET in 1995.15  
Like a simple machine in which one can see all the moving parts, it was 
relatively easy for users to trust this basic model of the Internet. It was 
simple enough that almost any engineer could understand it, and when 
problems occurred, they were relatively easy to identify and address. If 
these problems required the help of others, that help would be forthcoming, 
in part because the hierarchical structure of the network created a clear 
division of responsibility, and in part simply because everyone shared the 
common goal of making the network function.  
In fact, trust was a necessity in the early days of the Internet. Many of 
the current tools used in response to trust-related concerns were not viable 
in the early days of the Internet. For instance, the encryption technology 
that is used to secure online transactions (“public-key” encryption) was 
unknown to the public before 1976.16 And, prior to the 1990s, even to the 
 
13 See, e.g., Susan R. Harris & Elise Gerich, Retiring the NSFNET Backbone Service: Chronicling 
the End of an Era, CONNEXIONS, April 1996, at 2, 3-9 (discussing the upgrade of the NSFNET 
backbone from T1 to T3 circuits in order to increase the capacity on the backbone connections). It 
was not until the rise of high-bandwidth interactive applications, such as interactive voice, 
massively multiplayer online gaming, or video-on-demand services, that something more than 
additional capacity was necessary to ensure the network provided sufficient resources to all 
applications sharing it. See infra notes 27, 53 and accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., Harris & Gerich, supra note 13, at 2 (“The first NSFNET . . . backbone . . . linked 
the six nationally funded supercomputer centers and seven mid-level networks.”). 
15 See id.  
16 The current version of the Internet Protocol used across most of the Internet, IPv4, was 
developed from 1977 through 1981. See Jon Postel, Internet Protocol: DARPA Internet Program 
Protocol Specification 1-3 (IETF Def. Advanced Research Projects Agency RFC No. 791, 1981), 
available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc791.txt.pdf (describing the Internet system 
developed by the Department of Defense and citing to sources from the late 1970s). This system 
built upon the work of Vinton G. Cerf and Robert E. Kahn. See Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. 
Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637 
(1974). The principles underlying public-key encryption were first publicly disclosed in Whitfield 
Diffie and Marlin E. Hellman’s New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. 
THEORY 644 (1976), followed shortly thereafter by R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman’s A 
Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems, 21 COMM. ACM 120 (1978). 
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extent that the technology was widely known, it was too resource-intensive 
to be widely used.17 
C. Losing Trust 
The Internet’s character began changing in the early 1990s. During the 
NSFNET era, the NSFNET backbone was the only game in town, and its 
rules limited use of the Internet to research and education applications.18 
The creation of the Commercial Internet eXchange (CIX) in 1991, however, 
signaled the beginning of a period of transformation for the Internet.19 In 
1992, Congress passed legislation that allowed the NSF to permit non-
research and educational uses, provided that such use would “tend to 
increase the overall capabilities of the networks to support such research 
and education activities”—i.e., commercial traffic.20 
In conjunction with this legislative change, in 1992, NSFNET began 
winding down its role as the primary Internet backbone provider.21 In 1993, 
NSFNET solicited bids from firms to build a nationwide backbone network 
on a commercial basis, the construction of which began in 1994.22 On April 
30, 1995, the NSFNET backbone was officially shut down.23 
The decommissioning of NSFNET was part of a broader explosion of 
the Internet. As the Internet was commercialized, the number of service 
 
17 See Ashar Aziz, Draft: Simple Key-Management for Internet Protocols (SKIP) 2 (IETF 1994), 
available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-ietf-ipsec-aziz-skip-00.pdf (“[B]oth the protocol and 
computational overhead of [state-of-the-art encryption] is very high.”); see also S. Kent & R. 
Atkinson, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol 42-43 (IETF Network Working Grp. 
RFC No. 1825, 1998), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc2401.txt.pdf (noting the 
costs associated with increased security measures); George Apostolopoulos et al., Securing 
Electronic Commerce: Reducing the SSL Overhead, IEEE NETWORK, July/Aug. 2000, at 8, 10-13 
(discussing the high overhead of encryption efforts); Diffie & Hellman, supra note 16, at 653 (“For 
cryptographic purposes, typical computational costs must be considered.”). 
18 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., REVIEW OF NSFNET 38 (1993), 
available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1993/oig9301/oig9301.txt (chronicling the National Science 
Foundation’s regulation of NSFNET). 
19 See Fallout from the ANS “Proposal” of January 1991, COOK REP. ON INTERNET PROTOCOL 
(1993), http://www.cookreport.com/p.part3.shtml (describing the agreement announced at the 
Internet Service Provider’s Workshop held at the United States Congress Office of Technology 
Assessment on February 14, 1991, regarding the formation of the Commercial Internet eXchange). 
20 Scientific and Advanced-Technology Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-476, sec. 4, § 3, 106 
Stat. 2297, 2300 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1862(g) (2006)). 
21 See Harris & Gerich, supra note 13, at 3-4 (chronicling the gradual demise of the NSFNET 
backbone). 
22 Id. at 4. 
23 Id. at 4-6. 
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providers, services, and users grew exponentially.24 There was also a boom 
on the equipment side of the business. NSFNET had interconnected 
networks using general-purpose IBM mainframes with multiple network 
interfaces.25 The new Internet was being built on specialized equipment 
called routers26—as the technology continued to evolve, this equipment 
increasingly included specialized features.27 
In addition to these technological changes, the most obvious change to 
the Internet following commercialization of the backbone was the growth in 
the number of users and uses. The Internet went from adding tens of 
thousands of users per month to hundreds of thousands of users, driven by 
an increasing range of applications.28 Perhaps the most notable of these 
applications was the World Wide Web, released in 1993.29 The Web rep-
resented two fundamental shifts in Internet use: First, it had mass appeal—
anyone could use the Web. Second, it embraced the interconnected nature 
of the Internet on an unforeseen scale. A single web page could easily pull 
information from dozens of sources—using dozens of connections—in ways 
entirely transparent to the user.30 
The emerging form of the Internet was precisely the Internet that its 
designers had hoped to prove would be possible. This was only the tip of 
 
24 See FRAZER, supra note 8, at 5 (“From 217 networks connected in July of 1988 to more than 
50,000 in April of 1995 when the NSFNET backbone service was retired, the NSFNET's 
exponential growth stimulated the expansion of the worldwide Internet . . . .”).  
25 See id. at 7-11 (highlighting the contributions of the corporate partners to the NSFNET 
backbone, particularly the fact that IBM “provide[d] the computing systems for the network, 
including hardware and software, and MCI . . . provide[d] the underlying telecommunications 
circuits for the NSFNET”). 
26 See id. at 18 (recalling the need for “appropriate hardware and software” to supplement the 
NSFNET backbone, including the need for routers). 
27 See James Aweya, On the Design of IP Routers, Part 1: Router Architectures, 46 J. SYSTEMS 
ARCHITECTURE 483, 483-508 (2000) (offering a detailed examination of routers and identifying 
trends in router design); András Császár et al., Converging the Evolution of Router Architectures and 
IP Networks, IEEE NETWORK, Aug. 2007, at 8, 9-11 (reviewing the architectural developments 
leading to modern routers); Jim Duffy, Evolution of the Router, NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://www.networkworld.com/slideshows/2009/020909-evolution-router.html (providing a pictorial 
account of the development of the router). 
28 See Internet Host Count History, supra note 10 (enumerating the number of Internet hosts 
since August 1981).  
29 The technologies underlying the Web were developed over a period of years, but the 
web’s release into the public domain in 1993 is recognized as its birth year. See Press Release, W. 
Hoogland, Dir. of Research, & H. Weber, Dir. of Admin., Eur. Org. for Nuclear Research, 
Statement Concerning CERN W3 Software Release into Public Domain (Apr. 30, 1993), available at 
http://tenyears-www.web.cern.ch/tenyears-www/Welcome.html (announcing public access to the 
World Wide Web). 
30 See Solum & Chung, supra note 3, at 835-42 (discussing “the transparency of the network 
to applications” despite the “layered architecture” of the Internet). 
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the iceberg, moreover: over the following decade, driven partially by the 
growth of consumer grade, high-speed Internet access, the Internet grew in 
size and complexity at a break-neck pace.31  
This move away from a network built on “mutually trusting users 
attached to a transparent network” has continued unabated up to the present 
moment. The greatest technological change to the Internet architecture 
during the 1990s was the rise of active intermediaries. Every part of the 
Internet architecture—from the routers and switches, to the applications and 
services occupying the edges of the network—is increasingly interconnected. 
The result, and purpose, of these interconnections is to allow for active 
intermediation of user data. Routers no longer passively forward datagrams 
from one network interface to another; they decide to which interface to 
forward datagrams, and with what priority, based upon the contents, 
context, or even prior existing state of the packet.32 Servers no longer 
provide deterministic responses to client requests, but rather evaluate myriad 
data, much of which is unavailable to the client, in order to determine which 
response to provide.33 
Typical end users seem unaware or unconcerned by the changes dis-
cussed above. This is because end-user perception of the Internet’s trust-
worthiness lags behind the network’s actual trustworthiness. There are two 
explanations of this phenomenon. First, sociological literature has found 
that humans are predisposed to trust impersonal interactions, such as those 
that occur on the Internet.34 This predisposition has certainly been a 
significant factor in facilitating the Internet’s current reach. But it is 
possible, even likely, that the post-trust Internet will disabuse users of this 
predisposition over time. When the curtain is pulled back, so to speak, it is 
 
31 See Császár et al., supra note 27, at 8 (“The elementary network architecture of the 
ARPANET . . . has grown into a complex network of autonomously operated domains intercon-
nected by a sophisticated inter-domain control infrastructure.”); K.G. Coffman & Andrew 
Odlyzko, The Size and Growth Rate of the Internet, FIRST MONDAY (Oct. 5, 1998), available at 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/620/541 (charting 
the trajectory of public use of the Internet during the 1990s, which included an approximately one-
hundred percent annual growth rate). 
32 Id. at 9-11. 
33 See generally David Plans Casal, Advanced Software Development for Web Applications 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.jisc.ac.uk/uploaded_documents/jisctsw_05_ 
05pdf.pdf. (describing the sophistication of web application frameworks); Barry Doyle & Cristina 
Videira Lopes, Survey of Technologies for Web Application Development (2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://arxiv.org/pdf/0801.2618v1.pdf (exploring the development of 
technologies for the Web and concluding that the lack of uniformity therein stems from the lack 
of a singular model for such development). 
34 Camp et al., supra note 6, at 97 (“Previous research has supported the hypothesis that 
people are more trusting of computers than of other people.”). 
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unclear what will replace trust in allowing users to feel confident in the 
network. 
Second, the growth of the Internet to date has benefitted greatly from 
investors’ and firms’ belief in the platform and their concomitant willingness 
to shield users from trust-eroding concerns. For instance, average credit 
card loss rates are about 0.07% for all transactions, but over 1% for online 
transactions—roughly fifteen times higher.35 And this problem is likely to 
get worse over time.36 Online e-retail transactions represent only about 5% 
of total domestic retail transactions, a number that is growing at approxi-
mately 15% per year.37 As the volume of transactions continues to grow, so 
too will the incentives for fraud. It is less clear that Internet-based firms 
and intermediaries will continue to subsidize these losses.38 
A converse implication of investors’ and firms’ belief in the platform is 
an expectation that the platform will be profitable. To be sure, their interest 
in developing and operating intermediaries is not altruistic. This marks a 
fundamental change in the nature of the Internet architecture—prior to 
commercialization, intermediaries were not operated with a profit motive.39 
 
35 Compare Julia S. Cheney et al., The Efficiency and Integrity of Payment Card Systems: Industry 
Views on the Risks Posed by Data Breaches, ECON. PERSP., Fourth Quarter 2012, at 130, 132 (noting 
loss rates between 0.05% and 0.09% for all transactions), with CYBERSOURCE, 2012 ONLINE 
FRAUD REPORT 1 (approximating 1% loss rates for e-retail transactions). For a comparison of U.S. 
fraud statistics with those of other nations, see Richard J. Sullivan, Econ. Research, Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Presentation to the Conference on the Role of Government in Payments 
Risk and Fraud: Payments Fraud Statistics (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/ 
news/conferences/11rprf/11rprf_Sullivan.pdf. 
36 See Sullivan, supra note 35. 
37 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: 3rd Quarter 2012 
tbl.1 (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf. 
38 This is particularly true for two reasons. First, credit card fraud detection efforts do not 
scale well. They involve substantial manual review and processing. Fraud activity, on the other 
hand, scales quite well. Credit card account information is readily sold online for as little as one 
dollar per card (for ordinary credit cards), and between five and twenty dollars per card (for 
higher-end cards, depending upon spending limits). Second, interchange reform efforts, such as 
those reflected in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.), and recent antitrust settle-
ments with Visa and Mastercard, see, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, MasterCard and Visa Will Pay 
Billions to Settle Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at B1, are likely to usher in an era of 
higher prices for credit cards as opposed to debit cards. Debit transactions, however, are not 
subject to the protections of the Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. (2006)). It is thus far harder to recover money lost to 
fraudulent debit card transactions than to credit card transactions. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 163(a) 
(limiting the liability of credit card holders to charges over $50 under certain conditions), with 15 
U.S.C. § 1693g (allowing either uncapped liability or liability up to $500, but placing greater 
burdens on the cardholder).  
39 See KEMPF & AUSTEIN, supra note 7, at 7 (“Academic and government institutions ran the 
Internet of 15 years ago. These institutions did not expect to make a profit from their investment 
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The incentives of intermediaries and users were thus typically aligned. In 
the wake of commercialization, intermediaries increasingly face conflicting 
incentives and this creates a fault line between the interests of intermediaries 
and those of users. 
D. The Post-Trust Internet 
These changes have ushered in the era of a brave new Internet—one in 
which many new social and economic institutions seem at first blush 
wondrous and vital, but on deeper inspection may be built upon questionable 
foundations. Users’ ability to trust other users and the architecture of the 
early Internet helped define that Internet’s institutional equilibria. But as 
the users and architecture continue to change, and especially as users begin 
to question whether the Internet is a trustworthy platform, so, too, will 
these equilibria change. 
The remainder of this Section considers reasons that these social and 
economic institutions may not be sustainable in the post-trust Internet. The 
basic concern is that the Internet architecture, which in the early Internet 
age allowed users to interact in new and positive ways, can now be turned 
against users in ways that harm them. Active intermediaries now are 
capable of using and manipulating user data in ways that were never before 
possible, and the danger is exacerbated because there is increasing incentive 
for data to be used in harmful ways. Absent a mechanism to prevent such 
use—or, in the language of trust, “recourse”—we can expect users to resist 
active intermediation. Indeed, this is precisely what we have witnessed in 
the cases of network neutrality and online privacy.40 
Users can be harmed online through many vectors. The best-known 
concern is harm from other users. Harm from other users can come in many 
forms, for instance: hackers breaking into computers, online bullying or the 
spread of harmful information, the dissemination of disturbing or disruptive 
information such as spam, or outright fraudulent activity.41 Much ink has 
been spilled over these issues, often with a focus on how intermediaries can 
be harnessed to help protect users from harm caused by other users.42 
 
in networking technology. In contrast, the network operator with which most Internet users deal 
today is the commercial ISP . . . [whose] investors rightly expect . . . to turn a profit.”); see also 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 18, at 28-30 (describing the onset of commercial 
investment in the Internet).  
40 See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.  
41 These are the sorts of concerns animating calls for intermediaries to be liable for user 
conduct, as discussed by the sources in supra note 2.  
42 For examples of authors arguing for various forms of direct and vicarious liability, see supra 
note 2. 
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But as intermediaries have come to play an active role in the processing 
and transmission of data online, they also have become a vector for harming 
end users. Routers and switches, for instance, can prioritize data for certain 
users and applications.43 This basic concern is familiar in the context of 
network neutrality—though network neutrality concerns are generally 
limited to routers and switches located near the edges of the network (e.g., 
those hosted by users’ Internet Service Providers (ISPs)). User- and 
applications-based prioritization can occur throughout the Internet, from the 
data link layer up through the application layer.44 Similarly, active intermedi-
aries can collect and manipulate user information in ways that are entirely 
transparent to users. These two concerns may be joined together, with 
intermediaries collecting user data to identify favored (e.g., more profitable) 
or disfavored users, and offering them better or worse service. 
The aforementioned examples envision intermediaries acting deliberately. 
Active intermediation also increases the likelihood and prospective extent of 
inadvertent harms. The complexity of the Internet makes it difficult to 
properly configure intermediaries.45 For instance, there have been multiple 
cases over the past few years where certificate authorities46 have themselves 
fallen prey to security vulnerabilities, allowing their systems to be used to 
issue forged security certificates.47 Similarly, there have been cases, again in 
just the past year or two, where routers were misconfigured to transfer data 
 
43 Császár et al., supra note 27.  
44 For an explanation of layering, see Solum & Chung, supra note 3, at 817-18. 
45 For example, the more active the intermediary, the more complicated it is to configure 
correctly. See Theophilus Benson, Aditya Akella & Aman Shaikh, Demystifying Configuration 
Challenges and Trade-offs in Network-based ISP Service (2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2011/papers/sigcomm/p302.pdf (exploring the 
increasing complexities of service configurations over time); Theophilus Benson, Aditya Akella & 
David Maltz, Unraveling the Complexity of Network Management (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~akella/papers/complexity-nsdi.pdf (analyzing network complexity based 
on a host of “complexity models” developed by the authors). 
46 Certificate authorities are intermediaries responsible for issuing and managing the encryp-
tion keys that allow users to securely send encrypted information to known counterparties over 
the Internet. 
47 See Byron Acohido, Trust in the Internet Falters After DigiNotar, Comodo Hacked, THE LAST 
WATCHDOG ON INTERNET SECURITY (Sept. 28, 2011), http://lastwatchdog.com/trust-internet-
wavers-diginotar-comodo-hacked (“Digital certificates enable consumers to submit information 
that travels through an encrypted connection between the user’s web browser and a website server. 
The certificate assures the web page can be trusted as authentic. But the unprecedented attacks 
against [certificate authorities] shows how fragile that trust can be.”); Peter Bright, Comodo 
Hacker: I Hacked DigiNotar Too; Other CAs Breached, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/security/2011/09/comodo-hacker-i-hacked-diginotar-too-other-cas-breached 
(warning of future attacks and discussing purported “stopgap solutions”).  
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from U.S.-based senders to U.S.-based receivers along a path that traversed 
routers in China, Indonesia, and Pakistan.48 
Both of these examples—and there is an alarming number of additional 
ones49—demonstrate two types of potential intermediary-based harm to end 
users: harm caused by negligence, or harm caused by malicious third-parties 
taking control of active intermediaries. Most important, this sort of harm is 
possible only because these are active intermediaries. In the earlier era of 
the Internet, built upon a network of passive intermediaries, those passive 
intermediaries lacked the sophistication necessary to harm (or to be used to 
harm) individual users.50 
 
48 See, e.g., Matt Brian, Routing Error Momentarily Sends AT&T Facebook Data Via China, THE 
NEXT WEB (Mar. 23, 2011), http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2011/03/23/routing-error-momentarily-
sends-att-facebook-data-via-china (quoting a security researcher as stating that “Chinese authorities 
were likely to monitor unencrypted traffic” passing through their network even though no 
“sensitive information was compromised”); Martin A. Brown, Pakistan Hijacks YouTube: A Closer 
Look, CIRCLE ID (Feb. 25, 2008, 12:17 PM PST), http://www.circleid.com/posts/82258_ 
pakistan_hijacks_youtube_closer_look (suggesting that the hijacking problem “remains one of 
transitive trust”); Barrett Lyon, Hey AT&T Customers: Your Facebook Data Went to China and S. 
Korea This Morning . . ., BLYON (Mar. 22, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://www.blyon.com/hey-att-
customers-your-facebook-data-went-to-china-and-korea-this-morning (questioning whether this 
incident involved a data breach or was “just the way the Internet functions”); Ram Mohan, Routing 
on the Internet: A Disaster Waiting to Happen?, SECURITY WEEK (Dec. 1, 2001), http://www. 
securityweek.com/routing-internet-disaster-waiting-happen (warning against the “rapid growth 
and fragmentation of core routing tables” as “one of the most significant threats to the long-term 
stability and scalability of the Internet”); Tom Paseka, Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit 
About How the Internet Works, CLOUDFLARE, (Nov. 6, 2012), http://blog.cloudflare.com/why-
google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about (describing outages at Google due to the routing of 
information through Indonesia and Pakistan); YouTube Hijacking: A Ripe NCC RIS Case Study, RIPE 
NCC (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.ripe.net/internet-coordination/news/industry-developments/ 
youtube-hijacking-a-ripe-ncc-ris-case-study (concluding that unauthorized announcements by foreign 
networks can be prevented from spreading by “appropriate routing configuration of operators of 
Autonomous Systems”).  
49 Consider, for instance, accounts showing that routers and switches are susceptible to 
attack. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, China Tech Giant Under Fire—Congressional Probe Says Huawei 
Poses National-Security Threat to the U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2012, at A1, (“[A] year-long 
investigation by the House intelligence committee concluded [two Chinese telecommunications 
corporations] pose security risks to the U.S. because their equipment could be used for spying on 
Americans.”); Dan Goodin, Secret Account in Mission-Critical Router Opens Power Plants to Tampering, 
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 4, 2012) http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/09/secret-account-in-mission-
critical-router-opens-power-plants-to-tampering (contextualizing a warning issued by the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security that “power utilities, railroad operators, and other large industrial 
players [face] a weakness in a widely used router that leaves them open to tampering by untrusted 
employees”); Darren Pauli, Hardcoded Passwords Leave Telstra Routers Wide Open, SC MAG. (Nov. 13, 
2012), http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/322729,hardcoded-passwords-leave-telstra-routers-wide-
open.aspx (describing a patch issued by an Internet provider to prevent the likelihood of hacking 
due to a network glitch). 
50 To be sure, passive intermediaries can fail, or be used improperly, in ways that could harm 
users. See, e.g., J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed & D.D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 
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Vint Cerf explains that “[e]very layer of the Internet’s architecture is 
theoretically accessible to users and, in consequence, users (and abusers) can 
exploit vulnerabilities in any of the layers.”51 In an Internet of passive 
intermediaries, most layers of the Internet contained insufficient logic to be 
meaningfully exploited; in a network of active intermediaries, the network 
itself can be exploited and turned against its users. 
Despite these concerns, active intermediation is not entirely detrimental 
(to the contrary, active intermediation has the potential to add substantial 
value to the Internet value chain52) to the ability to combine data from 
multiple sources over a single communications channel.53 This creates value 
because it allows many users to efficiently share resources that would 
otherwise lie fallow. Many active intermediation technologies are an 
evolution of earlier technologies that enable this sharing, working to more 
efficiently squeeze the value out of the network infrastructure.54 Indeed, 
whereas earlier technologies statistically multiplexed data along a bandwidth 
dimension, one way of understanding technologies like prioritization, 
quality of service (QoS), and active queue management (AQM) is that 
they enable statistical multiplexing along a second (temporal) dimension.55  
Another form of active intermediation is tailoring the online experience to 
individual users. This is most familiarly seen in targeted advertising. 
 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277, 280 (1984) (discussing the “[t]oo-[r]eal 
[e]xample” of a transient bit-flipping error in a network gateway’s memory). But such harm would 
occur stochastically, and would generally be visible to a broad range of users. 
51 Vint Cerf, Internet Governance: A Centroid of Multistakeholder Interests, in MIND 
CO:LLABORATORY DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 1: INTERNET POLICYMAKING (Sept. 2011), 
at 74, 76. 
52 As one example, the most basic technological premise of the Internet is statistical multi-
plexing. 
53 Damon Wischik et al., The Resource Pooling Principle, 38 ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER 
COMM. REV. 47, 48 (2008) (“Statistical multiplexing through packet switching is the most 
fundamental concept in the Internet architecture.”). 
54 Today, we are seeing substantial investment in private networks to bypass large parts of 
the Internet for content-delivery purposes. From the perspective of the traditional Internet, this is 
harmful, because these content-delivery networks allow firms to place more data on the network 
without allowing other users to opportunistically share any new capacity when the network is 
unused. But this approach is a practical necessity for large-scale content delivery, because the state 
of the art in content delivery is not yet sufficient to allow for multiplexed content-delivery 
infrastructures. See id. 
55 See supra notes 13, 31-32 and accompanying text. A network’s performance can be character-
ized in terms of both capacity (the amount of data it can transmit in a given period of time) and 
latency (the amount of time it takes to transmit a single bit of data). The project of statistical 
multiplexing has generally focused on allowing multiple connections to efficiently share the finite 
capacity resource. But multiplexed connections also share, and impose congestion externalities 
upon each other’s use of, the latency resource. In this sense, technologies such as those mentioned 
above are part and parcel of the same project as statistical multiplexing.  
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However, targeted ads are only one example of application-level active 
intermediation.56 While this form of intermediation, and the privacy 
implications implied therein, raise legitimate concerns, it is also undeniable 
that users benefit from it. Online advertising revenue is the fuel that fires 
the consumer Internet’s engine.57 
The natural response to these concerns is, and has been, to resist active 
intermediation. This is seen in the public’s response to network neutrality 
concerns and, in turn, the Federal Communication Commission’s Open 
Internet Order.58 Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission’s privacy 
reports59 and investigations into firms like Google and Facebook, along with 
even stronger proposed regulation in the European Union,60 and over-
whelming opposition to legislative proposals such as the Stop Online Piracy 
Act (SOPA)61 and the PROJECT IP Act (PIPA)62—meant to streamline 
information-sharing between firms and the government to implement more 
effective cybersecurity programs—demonstrate the public’s preference for a 
simpler, more passive network. 
This preference is understandable and follows from the trust equation. 
Users are unwilling to rely on technologies that may be used to harm them 
unless they are able to seek recourse against those harms. Even if these 
technologies bring benefits, because they operate transparently to users 
 
56 Other examples of active application-level active intermediation include location-based 
services, predictive searching, and remembering implicit preferences. The latter is especially 
important in a world in which one extra click can be the downfall of a given service.  
57 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and 
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281, 283 (2012) 
(“The value created by online advertising, which fuels the majority of free content and services 
available online, has been immense.”). 
58 See FCC Open Internet Order, 47 C.F.R. § 8.1 (2012) (defining the purpose of the Open 
Internet Order to “preserve the Internet as an open platform enabling consumer choice, freedom 
of expression, end-user control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission”). 
59 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (Mar. 2012), available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (evaluating potential initiatives to enhance 
Internet privacy and making recommendations to private companies regarding such initiatives). 
60 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/0011/C
OM_COM(2012)0011_EN.pdf (revising the European Union’s approach to personal data privacy, 
which already limits how intermediaries can use personal data more strictly than in the United 
States, to even further limit how user data can be used by intermediaries with requirements such 
as “privacy by design” and a “right to be forgotten”). 
61 H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
62 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property 
Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. § 3(d)(2)(D). 
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there is little, or at best, limited, opportunity for recourse. The preference, 
therefore, is to reject active intermediation in favor of an Internet less 
capable of causing harm.  
Importantly, this preference has two distinct effects: encouraging passive 
intermediation, and limiting the development of new active intermediation 
technologies.63 The inability to trust the Internet architecture, therefore, 
has the pernicious effect of limiting the development of technologies that 
might make the architecture more trustworthy. 
II. LIVING WITHOUT TRUST 
In the previous Part, I argued that the early Internet was built on a 
foundation of trust, but that this foundation has given way as the Internet 
has evolved. The primary drivers of this change are the increasing complexity 
of the network—especially with the rise of active intermediation—and the 
transition away from a small community of users generally interested in the 
success of the Internet and toward a large user base, with diverse and often 
adverse interests, and no particular interest in the Internet as a technology 
in and of itself.  
This transition is problematic because it is unclear what can replace 
trust—a willingness of users to rely on the Internet architecture without 
assurances that recourse is available should they be harmed—as a foundation 
for online interaction. The Internet is not the only institution that needs to 
operate without trust, however. In fact, many institutions operate in such an 
environment. 
This Section looks to three standard approaches used by institutions to 
foster interaction in lieu of trust: the law, mechanisms that “establish trust” 
endogenously, and vertical integration.64 
A. Legal Recourse 
The law offers a simple alternative to trust: remedies. In contrast to 
trust-based institutions’ premise of reliance without recourse, legal institu-
tions stand on the promise of reliance with recourse. Where parties are 
unable to rely on one another due to lack of trust, the law steps in as an 
 
63 See infra Part IV. 
64 Analytically, these alternatives comprise a complete set of options. Given a set of inter-
mediaries, {I1 . . . In}, recourse can be sought in one of three ways: (1) exogenously, relying on an 
entity outside of the set of intermediaries; (2) endogenously, by relying on the intermediaries to 
coordinate recourse amongst themselves; or (3) by integrating the set of intermediaries into a 
single entity I1—n to internalize harm.  
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external institution to enforce parties’ expectations, thereby allowing them 
to rely on one another without jeopardizing their security. 
The clearest example of this phenomenon is contract law, which can be 
understood precisely as the law of enforcing mutual expectations between 
individuals. But the law’s role in fostering a willingness among individuals 
to rely on one another is not limited to contract law; most private legal 
institutions benefit this goal. Tort law, for instance, establishes duties that 
individuals have to each other independent of any mutual agreement. These 
duties create expectations regarding how parties will treat one another, on 
which they can rely, and upon which they can seek recourse. And property 
law establishes domains in which parties know they need not (or must) 
defer to other parties’ expectations, and provides remedies when those 
domains are encroached upon.  
These different areas of the law serve a common purpose: facilitating 
interactions between individuals. The menu of different mechanisms exists 
due to the underlying characteristics of various sorts of interactions.65 But 
each faces the same basic set of issues: What is the duty placed upon each 
party? What is the mechanism for enforcement when that duty is breached? 
What are the damages for that breach?66  
Contract law, for instance, gives parties great flexibility in determining 
their mutual duties, including specifying their preferred consequences for 
breach of duty, but imposes various requirements upon the parties to ensure 
that courts understand (and will enforce) their agreement.67 Tort law, on 
the other hand, often operates in situations where parties are unable to 
negotiate ex ante, and therefore relies on generalized duties and indicia of 
harm to determine a party’s responsibility.68 In comparison, property law 
 
65 As Coase famously made clear, absent transaction costs, the legal rule would not matter. 
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  
66 For examples of work relating areas of law to one another, see Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972) (relating property and liability rules); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 809-48 (2001) (relating 
contract and property law depending on whether the property right is in rem or in personam).  
67 Think, for instance, of offer and acceptance. See generally Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts 
Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract 
Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2008) (explaining realism’s view of offer and acceptance in 
contract theory); Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and Contempo-
rary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115, 119 (2006) (discussing the “mailbox rule,” in which “acceptance of an 
offer made by correspondence is effective immediately upon dispatch . . . even if the offeror has 
not yet received it”). 
68 As a result, damages in tort are more limited. For instance, purely economic harms are 
generally not recoverable under a tort claim. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule 
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assigns the clearest duties between parties, allowing owners to rely on the 
quiet enjoyment of their property and prohibiting nonowners from any 
reliance on that property without the permission of the owner. 
The basic feature of the law as a mechanism for establishing trust is that 
it is an external institution that imposes rules upon private, interacting 
parties. The different mechanisms of contract, tort, and property law are 
structured to facilitate different types of interactions. However, these 
doctrines are simultaneously structured to facilitate the operation of the law 
in its own right. Contract law disfavors oral agreements, for instance, 
because they are more difficult—and sometimes impossible—for courts to 
interpret and enforce. Tort law places the burden to prove harm on the 
injured party because the injured party is best situated to provide both the 
court and the defendant with information needed to proceed. Property law, 
meanwhile, operates where parties can easily negotiate over clearly defined 
boundaries. This requires property owners to establish boundaries and 
requires courts to impose strict penalties on parties who violate properly 
maintained boundaries, in order to foster private negotiation. 
As an external institution, the law relies on parties to an interaction to 
provide sufficient information for legal mechanisms to operate. This is, in 
part, why the law has historically recognized a closed number of forms of 
property, contracts, and other mechanisms for interaction.69 The advent of 
general causes of action and the ability to freely negotiate novel contracts 
are still relatively recent innovations in the law. The problem of observable 
but nonverifiable information (information available to parties to an 
interaction but information that cannot be demonstrated to a court or 
another third party) is a central problem in contract theory, with corre-
sponding problems in other areas of the law.70 
Recourse to legal institutions therefore offers one mechanism for facili-
tating interactions between untrusting parties—subject to important 
constraints. One set of constraints is that specific legal institutions must be 
contoured to the characteristics of specific interactions. What this means in 
the context of online interactions will be considered in Part III. A more 
 
and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813 (2006) (grounding economic loss in the law of contract 
rather than tort law because of the law’s respect for private ordering between parties). 
69 For meaningful commentary on the limited variations of property law, see generally Juan 
Javier Del Granado, The Genius of Roman Law from a Law and Economics Perspective, 13 SAN DIEGO 
INT’L L.J. 301 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).  
70 See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. 
STUDS. 115, 124 (1999) (describing the sufficiency of the “observable but non-verifiable” assump-
tion to a theory of incomplete contracts).  
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fundamental constraint is that legal institutions can only operate where 
sufficient information is available to individuals and to courts. In the 
context of online interactions, where a design goal of the Internet is to 
seamlessly facilitate myriad transparent and transient interactions, this 
may prove a fundamental limitation on effectuating the law online. Part 
III will also consider the tradeoffs this might require between the oper-
ation of legal institutions online and the design choices underlying the 
Internet architecture. 
B. Vertical Integration 
Legal institutions are costly. The cost, for instance, of negotiating and 
entering into a formal contract is substantial, as is the cost of enforcing the 
contract in court following a breach and collecting damages. In his seminal 
1937 article, Ronald Coase identified these costs as the reason that firms 
exist—why, in other words, independent actors agree to coordinate their 
efforts into integrated economic units called “firms.”71 
Coase asked why firms exist at all: Why do entrepreneurs have employees, 
when instead they could coordinate all factors of input (both labor and 
material) through contracts for labor and materials negotiated on the open 
market?72 Famously, Coase’s answer is that organizing into firms avoids 
many of the transaction costs inherent in the price mechanism—chief 
among these are the costs of contracting.73 Transaction costs can make firm-
like organizations less costly than relying on price mechanisms. Indeed, 
these costs may be high enough that it would be unprofitable to rely on the 
price mechanism, but still profitable to rely on firm-like organizations. 
Coase’s explanation for why firms exist in the first instance gave rise to 
decades of debate over the converse question: Given that firms avoid 
 
71 Coase, supra note 65. 
72 Id. at 392-93 (“One entrepreneur may sell his services to another for a certain sum of money, 
while the payment to his employees may be mainly or wholly a share in profits. The significant 
question would appear to be why the allocation of resources is not done directly by the price 
mechanism.”). 
73 According to Coase,  
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there 
is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organising” pro-
duction through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices 
are. This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of 
specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a 
separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must 
also be taken into account. 
Id. at 390. 
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transaction costs, why does any market have more than a single firm? The 
general answer is that, just as contracts and the price mechanism incur 
transaction costs, so too does the operation of the firm.74 There is, therefore, 
an optimal size to any given firm. 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling built on this framework to develop 
an agency cost model to understand the optimal size of a firm.75 According 
to their vision,  
If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason 
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the prin-
cipal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing 
appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs 
designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent.76 
Framing their analysis as a principal–agent problem also frames it as a trust 
problem. If an agent may have incentives that conflict with those of the 
principal, the agent cannot be trusted. It is possible that the principal could 
respond by structuring the relationship to offer recourse to legal institutions.77  
Rather than rely on legal institutions, Jensen and Meckling argue that 
firms may structure the principal–agent relationship so as to avoid (or 
reduce) the need for recourse.78 One such approach is to give the agent a 
stake in the outcome of the principal’s business.79 Another approach, which 
is generally understood as the greatest cost facing most firms, is for the 
principal to direct and monitor the work of her agent.  
The monitoring approach is similar to relying on a contract that is en-
forceable by recourse to a legal institution. Both parties have expectations of 
their relationship upon which they rely in conducting their interactions. But 
in the context of the firm, the principal is able to structure her agent’s 
conduct to ensure the availability of information sufficient to confirm the 
 
74 Id. at 394-98 (asking, “Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?” and suggesting 
several possibilities); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 126-29 (1975) (discussing limitations on the size of the firm).  
75 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) 
(using an agency model to understand the institutional design of a firm); Eugene F. Fama, Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980) (same). 
76 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 75, at 308 (emphasis omitted).  
77 Indeed, most principal–agent relationships do occur in the context of a contractual rela-
tionship. Id. at 310 (arguing that “[c]ontractual relations are the essence of the firm” and that 
“most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals” (emphasis omitted)). 
78 Id. at 308. 
79 For example, stock options or, conversely, bonding the agent to the principal. Id. at 308. 
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performance of these expectations, and the remedy for breach of these 
expectations is termination of the relationship, at the principal’s discretion.  
This yields a second mechanism for operating outside of trusted rela-
tionships: integration between parties to the interaction. This approach is 
effective where the parties can structure their interactions such that they 
face aligned incentives, or where monitoring is sufficient to dissuade an 
agent’s breach of the principal’s trust. The great advantage of this approach 
is that it does not require costly or uncertain recourse to an exogenous 
institution (such as a court). It is, however, limited to contexts where such 
integration is possible, where incentives can be aligned, and where discontin-
uation of the relationship is sufficient should recourse become necessary.80 
C. “Establishing Trust” 
Communities often develop endogenous mechanisms to facilitate interac-
tions between their members and to preserve the autonomy of their members 
without need for recourse to exogenous institutions like the law. This can be 
thought of as establishing trust between otherwise untrusting parties based 
on the circumstances of their interaction. 
Examples familiar to legal and economics scholars include the seminal 
works of Robert Ellickson and of Elinor Ostrom.81 Both consider how 
communities form rules between their members that are enforced internally. 
Indeed, when Ellickson examined Shasta County, he found that such rules 
can even form in the presence of working legal institutions, thereby demon-
strating that they can be preferred to legal recourse.82  
 
80 More substantial recourse could be available via legal mechanisms, subject to the limitations 
discussed above. One would expect, for instance, that an employer could both fire and sue an 
employee caught stealing from the company. 
81 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  
82 Ellickson notes that  
[i]n rural Shasta County, where transaction costs are assuredly not zero, trespass 
conflicts are generally resolved not in “the shadow of the law” but, rather, beyond 
that shadow. Most rural residents are consciously committed to an overarching norm of 
cooperation among neighbors. In trespass situations, their applicable particularized 
norm, adhered to by all but a few deviants, is that an owner of livestock is responsible 
for the acts of his animals. Allegiance to this norm seems wholly independent of 
formal legal entitlements.  
ELLICKSON, supra note 81, at 52-53. 
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Such approaches are probably the best-known responses to concerns 
about online trust today. Examples of this approach include reputation and 
encryption. 
Reputational models are among the most successful responses to concerns 
about trust online. One of the early pioneers of these models was eBay, 
which relied on parties to leave publicly viewable feedback about their 
interactions on its auction website. Users could rely on buyers and sellers 
with established histories of satisfactory dealings as more trustworthy than 
those without established histories (or, worse, with less-than-satisfactory 
histories). 
Similarly, parties that want to interact online but do not trust their data 
to be handled by untrusted intermediaries have long turned to encryption to 
protect against those intermediaries. To use encryption, the parties need to 
first coordinate the use of an encryption algorithm. This is done by relying 
on a trusted third party, called a certificate authority.83 
Both of these mechanisms (indeed, all mechanisms that rely on actors 
within a system to establish trust) are built upon the fundamental assump-
tion that parties being relied upon to establish trust are independent from 
the party for whom trust is being established.84 This has been a reasonable 
assumption for most of the Internet’s history. Of course, online trust has 
not been a problem for most of the Internet’s history. Where it may be 
possible for members of a community to co-opt that community’s trust-
establishing mechanisms, however, those mechanisms necessarily fail. 
The continuing viability of this assumption is suspect. Reputation 
mechanisms have proved to be effective in many cases, but these are 
typically cases where reputation is established by a relatively small or 
homogeneous community.85 These mechanisms have also fallen prey to 
manipulations meant precisely to breach trust—typically where those 
 
83 NETWORK ASSOCS., INC., AN INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 23 (1999), available at 
ftp://ftp.pgpi.org/pub/pgp/6.5/docs/english/IntroToCrypto.pdf (defining a certification authority, or 
CA, as “a human entity—a person, group, department, company, or other association—that an 
organization has authorized to issue certificates to its computer users”). 
84 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 81; OSTROM, supra note 81. 
85 Even eBay falls into this category, because its reputation mechanisms (which have 
required several modifications to prevent gaming) were initialized in the early days of the 
Internet. Indeed, most new online communities are born from a surprisingly small community of 
users. See Benjamin Jackson, How White is the New Internet?, BUZZFEED (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/benjaminj4/how-white-is-the-new-internet (illustrating the lack of 
gender and racial diversity among early adopters and emphasizing that “the earliest adopters are 
often influential . . . tech leaders based in and around New York and the Bay Area”). 
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seeking to establish trust, or their affiliates, attempt to manipulate the 
reputation system.86 
Endogenous systems have been subject to more serious problems. For 
instance, in 2011, a firm named DigiNotar was breached by hackers. Digi-
Notar is one of a small number of Certificate Authorities. As a result of this 
breach, false (but authentic) certificates were issued for a number of high-
profile Internet entities.87 In effect, the mechanism for establishing trust 
upon which online encryption is based requires users to ask themselves a 
more complicated question: to be effective, Internet browsers must ask, “Do 
we trust the person vouching for party A?” instead of, “Do we trust party A?”88 
 
86 “Astroturfing” is the best-known example of such efforts. See, e.g., George Monbiot, Robot 
Wars, MONBIOT (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.monbiot.com/2011/02/23/robot-wars (“The anonymity 
of the web gives companies and governments golden opportunities to run astroturf operations: 
fake grassroots campaigns, which create the impression that large numbers of people are demand-
ing or opposing particular policies.”). There are many specific examples of the significance of 
reputation in the Internet economy. See, e.g., Rachel Botsman, Welcome to the New Reputation 
Economy, WIRED UK (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/09/features/ 
welcome-to-the-new-reputation-economy (announcing an Internet “reputation economy, where 
[one’s] online history becomes more powerful than [one’s] credit history”); Ray Fisman, Should 
You Trust Online Reviews? Economists Weigh In, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/2012/08/tripadvisor_expedia_yelp_amazon_are_online_revi
ews_trustworthy_economists_weigh_in_.html (exploring the ease with which companies may 
invent positive reviews for themselves); Helen A.S. Popkin, Facebook: More Than 83 Million Users 
Are Fake, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/facebook-more-83-million-
users-are-fake-919873 (highlighting the increase in the creation of Facebook accounts for “fake” 
users); The Underground Economy of Social Networks, NET SECURITY (Aug. 7, 2012), http:// 
www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=13380 (reporting that the “underground economy” of fake 
online profiles “consists of dealers who create and sell the use of thousands of fake social accounts, 
and Abusers who buy follows or likes from these fake accounts to boost their perceived popularity, 
sell advertising based on their now large social audience or conduct other malicious activity”).  
87 See supra note 47. 
88 “Multifactor authentication” is a related trust-establishing mechanism. Multifactor 
authentication requires a user to provide multiple independent pieces of information (instead of 
simply a password) in order to establish her identity. Since 2005, financial institutions have been 
encouraged to adopt multifactor authentication for online transactions. See FED. FIN. INSTS. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT 1-2 
(2005), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf (“Where risk assess-
ments indicate that the use of single-factor authentication is inadequate, financial institutions 
should implement multifactor authentication, layered security, or other controls reasonably 
calculated to mitigate those risks.”). As with encryption, where the question becomes whether we 
trust the speaking party as well as the party vouching for it, multifactor authentication begs the 
question whether we trust both pieces of information. However, as with other mechanisms for 
establishing trust, malicious users have been able to bypass multifactor authentication. See, e.g., 
ERAN KALIGE, & DARRELL BURKEY, A CASE STUDY OF EUROGRABBER: HOW 36 MILLION 
EUROS WAS STOLEN VIA MALWARE (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.checkpoint.com/ 
products/downloads/whitepapers/Eurograbber_White_Paper.pdf (detailing a criminal effort to 
steal more than 36 million Euros from over 30,000 European banking customers by compromising 
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III. PROBLEMS WITH STANDARD SOLUTIONS TO 
LIVING WITHOUT TRUST 
The mechanisms considered in the previous Part work to facilitate inter-
actions between parties that may not trust each other. None, however, is 
sufficient to address the basic problem of online trust—that one of the 
design purposes of the Internet is to allow myriad users and intermediaries 
to interconnect in a transparent manner and independently of each other. 
Each mechanism also faces specific problems in the context of online 
interactions. This Part considers the reasons that each of these mechanisms 
is insufficient to address the lack of trust online.  
A. Limitations of Legal Institutions 
Legal institutions face two general problems when applied to online 
intermediaries. First, at a technical level, the operation of these intermediaries 
is meant to be transparent to the user. As a result, the basic information 
needed for the legal system to operate is unavailable. Second, even if 
sufficient information were available, it is unclear which legal rules a user 
could use to secure satisfactory recourse against intermediaries. 
As a design principle, users are not supposed to need—or even necessarily 
have access to—information about the operation of intermediaries. In fact, 
this principle, called layering, applies even more generally: just as users 
ought not to need information about the operation of intermediaries, 
intermediaries at one layer of the Internet ought not to need access to 
information about those deeper intermediaries.89 For instance, users should 
not need to know how their web browsers work; the web browser need not 
know how the computer is connected to the Internet but only that it is 
connected; and the protocols establishing the computer’s connection to the 
Internet need not know how the network is configured.  
But this means that users have very little visibility into the operation of 
the network. They may not even be able to recognize that harm is occurring 
in real time, and even then, they may only be able to make such a deter-
mination by inference or proxy.90 When users can identify that some harm is 
 
both customers’ computers and mobile phones in order to bypass their banks’ multifactor authentica-
tion).  
89 See Solum & Chung, supra note 3, at 829-31. 
90 See, e.g., PETER ECKERSLEY, FRED VON LOHMANN & SETH SCHOEN, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., PACKET FORGERY BY ISPS: A REPORT ON THE COMCAST AFFAIR 1-2 
(2007), available at https://www.eff.org/files/eff_comcast_report.pdf (detailing the discovery of 
Comcast’s handling of BitTorrent connections by a Comcast subscriber and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation); see also Jim Gettys & Kathleen Nichols, Bufferbloat: Dark Buffers in the 
  
  
1606 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1579 
 
occurring, they may not be able to localize its source to a single intermediary.91 
And even when they are able to locate the source, it is unlikely that they 
will be able to document the problem in a way cognizable to a court. 
The converse of this concern is equally problematic: users do not want 
to be exposed to the majority of information about the operation of inter-
mediaries. Most users lack the sophistication, or interest, to make use of 
such information. And, even in the early days of the Internet, simple online 
interactions could involve dozens of intermediaries. But it is a false choice 
to think that users must choose, or the technology must support, either a 
drought or a flood of information. The challenging questions are how much, 
and what, information is needed and relevant to support recourse to legal 
institutions—a topic discussed in this Section. 
The second general challenge facing the use of legal institutions to pro-
vide recourse is understanding what causes of action may apply to interac-
tions between users and intermediaries. Even if users have perfect 
information about how intermediaries (mis)handle their data, recourse will 
only be available subject to some cognizable legal claim. There are a number 
of possible causes of action that may apply, none of which fits the problem 
particularly well. 
A first possible cause of action may lie under contract law. If a user has 
reasonable expectations for how an intermediary will handle her data, and 
the intermediary fails to act in accordance with this expectation, liability 
might attach. This would clearly be the best approach if the user had an 
express contractual relationship with the intermediaries—that is, if the user 
had negotiated terms of service with a service-level agreement, monitoring 
guidelines, some consideration paid, and contractually defined damages. 
In the majority of online interactions, however, users generally never 
have any direct interactions with any given intermediary. In fact, users may 
never know about the intermediary’s involvement. Regardless, we might 
argue that a user who relies upon intermediaries to behave in a certain 
way—e.g., as defined by Internet standards organizations—might hold a 
reliance interest. Given the best-effort nature of the Internet, this nonetheless 
may prove challenging.92 A better argument might be that by conforming 
 
Internet, COMM. ACM, Jan. 2012, at 57, 57-65 (demonstrating the difficulty of diagnosing protocol 
problems). 
91 See supra note 90.  
92 The Internet provides “best-effort” service, meaning that intermediaries make no assurances 
for how or whether data will be delivered. See Eric Crawley et al., A Framework for QoS-based Routing 
in the Internet 4 (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 2386, 1998), available at http://tools.ietf. 
org/pdf/draft-ietf-qosr-framework-05.pdf (“Routing deployed in today's Internet . . . typically 
supports only one type of datagram service called ‘best effort.’”); Christopher Lefelhocz et al., 
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the information she sends over the Internet to standardized specifications, 
the user is expressing an understanding that the data will be handled in 
accordance with those expectations. The expectations, in turn, would be 
such that any intermediary that accepts the data, accepts it subject to those 
standards. In other words, offering data in conformance with standards, and 
accepting that data, could equate to an offer and acceptance in an agreement 
that the data will be handled in accordance with relevant standards.93  
This approach still presents difficulties. For instance, where is the con-
sideration supporting the agreement? The operator of the intermediary may 
receive compensation from some third party, but intermediaries rarely 
receive anything directly from the user. This setup presents a traditional 
privity of contract problem.94 Even if we iron out this wrinkle, there is still 
the question of damages, which are likely de minimis for any interaction. 
Unless the user can show consequential damages, any recovery is likely 
insufficient to justify bringing a claim. 
Tort law offers an alternative to the law of contract that overcomes privity 
of contract limitations. As the New York Court of Appeals held in MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co., the negligence of an upstream supplier is sufficient to 
establish liability between that supplier and a purchaser of the ultimate 
product, even in the absence of any relationship between the two.95 If an 
intermediary unreasonably handles a user’s data—for instance, by not 
properly implementing standards, misconfiguring those systems, or failing 
to monitor or secure its systems against hackers—in a way that causes harm 
to the user, an action might lie in tort. But here the fundamental limitation 
is the harm itself. Any harm is likely to be purely economic, and therefore 
generally unrecoverable under a negligence theory.96 
We might also consider theories under property law or intentional torts. 
For instance, a user might argue that she is the bailor of her data and the 
intermediaries her bailees. Or the user might claim that the intermediary 
has converted her data. The virtue of these approaches is that they offer 
 
Congestion Control for Best-Effort Service: Why We Need a New Paradigm, IEEE NETWORK, Jan.-
Feb. 1996, at 10, 10 (“[I]n best-effort service, the network tries to forward all packets as soon as 
possible, but cannot make any quantitative assurances about the quality of service delivered.”). 
93 At a technical level, this would likely require more express specification of the standards a 
user expects will govern the treatment of her data. For example, a user might expect a header 
option indicating that Internet Protocol (IP) traffic will only be accepted by routers implanting 
specific AQM technologies. 
94 See, e.g., Sisson v. Jankowski, 809 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.H. 2002) (“While a contract may 
supply the relationship, ordinarily the scope of the duty is limited to those in privity of contract 
with one another.” (citation omitted)).  
95 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
96 See supra note 68. 
  
1608 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1579 
 
more flexible damages, including punitive damages.97 That said, a user 
seeking to rely on these causes of action faces substantial hurdles. Bailor–
bailee claims, for instance, typically only lie where the property is damaged, 
not where the bailor is harmed by how the bailment is handled. And 
conversion would require some legally cognizable right violated by the 
intermediary by its very handling of data contrary to expectations. 
This leaves the user with the possibility of statutory causes of action to 
establish intermediary liability. Given the difficulty of establishing harm, 
and the limitations under existing common law causes of action, it may be 
appropriate to rely on statutory damages for specific classes of intermediary 
(mis)conduct. The details of any statutory approach would be complicated 
and controversial—indeed, the current statutory approach, as exemplified 
by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, is one of immunity for 
intermediaries.98 More importantly, as discussed in the next Part, it is 
premature to put in place a specific statutory scheme. But it is important to 
recognize that, depending on how the technology continues to evolve, 
statutory damages should be part of the discussion here. Engineers working 
to implement next-generation technologies should be aware that design 
decisions they make today will affect the legal rules adopted tomorrow. 
Awareness of a possible need for statutory damages, and the appurtenant 
controversies and difficulties, will encourage the development of next-
generation technologies that provide better access to the information 
necessary for legal institutions to work well. Alternatively, if the technology 
is incapable of supporting recourse to legal institutions, we should be wary 
of relying upon it to an extent that unduly exposes users to harm. 
B. Limitations of Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration is an incomplete response to trust-related concerns 
for a few reasons. First, it is incoherent as an approach, because broad 
integration between users and intermediaries is not possible. Second, it also 
runs afoul of a design principle of the Internet: the interconnection of 
independent actors. Third, there already is a great deal of vertical integra-
tion online—greater integration may be as much a poison as a cure. The 
challenging question is how much integration we want and between which 
 
97 See, e.g., Feld v. Feld, 783 F. Supp. 2d 76, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2011) (mem. opinion) (awarding 
punitive damages supported only by nominal harms in the case of an intentional trespass and 
discussing cases reaching this conclusion in other jurisdictions).  
98 See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying paragraph. 
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actors—an idea that leads to an important legal problem: whether and how 
to rely on joint and several liability to address trust concerns. 
The first and second of these concerns are fundamental but relatively 
straightforward. It is misleading to say that users can resolve their inability 
to trust intermediaries through vertical integration. This would require 
users to establish a management or ownership relationship with every 
intermediary with which they interact. Establishing such a relationship with 
even a few intermediaries would be difficult—each relationship would 
require overcoming the same informational and contractual issues that 
present challenges to legal institutions. And because most users do not 
derive revenue from their use of the Internet, joint ownership does not offer 
a solution, either: principals establish trust with their agents by offering the 
agents an ownership interest in the venture. This concept does not apply to 
the relationship between users and intermediaries.99 
Similarly, the very concept of the Internet is that it is a network of 
independent networks. Each of those networks may be integrated internally. 
But the relationship between networks is modular—each network is 
supposed to operate independently. Indeed, the greater concern about 
integration today is, if anything, that there is too much of it: there is 
substantial debate about media consolidation and whether the Internet is 
becoming a network of walled gardens.100 
Vertical integration will never prove a complete solution to trust concerns. 
However, it does play an important role. Traditionally, the Internet has 
separated various functions between intermediaries based upon technical 
considerations. The resulting boundaries segregate different functions into 
separate modules.101 The basic idea of modularity is that related functions 
 
99 To the extent that it might apply, it would be through competition, with intermediaries 
constrained by the concern that users might move away from them. 
100 See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 
(2008) (discussing the Internet’s transition from an open, generative platform that supports 
applications independent of any service-provider involvement to an increasingly locked-down, 
appliancized network, that can be used only for applications expressly facilitated by service 
providers); see also Bruce Schneier, When It Comes to Security, We’re Back to Feudalism, WIRED 
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/feudal-security (likening certain vendors 
to feudal lords to whom internet users must “pledge allegiance” as “vassals”). 
101 Engineers design systems using modular functions. See 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. 
CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 63-92, 149-220 (2000) (exploring the 
need for modularity in the creation of complex systems, such as computers); Clark et al., supra 
note 5, at 466 (“Systems designers know to break complex systems into modular parts.”); see also 
CARPENTER, supra note 3, at 4 (“Modularity is good. If you can keep things separate, do so.”). But 
see David D. Clark, Modularity and Efficiency in Protocol Implementation 1 (IETF RFC No. 817, 1982), 
available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc817.txt.pdf (arguing “that modularity is one of 
the chief villains in attempting to obtain good performance”). Each “module” implements a 
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that need to share information in order to operate efficiently should be 
grouped together. The information needed by those functions is kept 
internally and not shared with functions in other modules. This is an 
important design principle that should be embraced because the Internet 
would not be possible without it. 
The lesson to take from modularity, and that should be applied to future 
modular design decisions, is that modular boundaries should be drawn on 
boundaries designed to support both the technical and the nontechnical 
institutions that comprise the Internet ecosystem. This, in fact, runs 
directly counter to the approach put forth by David Clark, who has advo-
cated designing modular boundaries to isolate nontechnical issues so as to 
protect the technical architecture from legal controversy.102 Although this is 
an eminently reasonable way to design an architecture that is technically 
robust, it is an approach that is simultaneously all but designed to starve 
nontechnical institutions of the information needed to facilitate recourse. 
Indeed, the idea of modularity has a legal analog in joint and several 
liability. Where legal institutions are unable to assess or apportion liability 
between a group of defendants—typically because those defendants have 
private information needed for the legal institution to do so—the law will 
assess liability upon them as a whole.103 This is a modular approach. If a 
plaintiff targets one defendant out of a modular group of defendants, that 
defendant can implead other members to join the module.  
This analysis suggests that there may be separate legal and technical 
modular boundaries. The interesting, and challenging, question is whether 
these boundaries can or should be aligned. Where harm occurs, the law will 
seek to define the relevant modular boundaries needed to offer recourse 
(assuming there is a viable cause of action). Conforming the technology to 
these legal boundaries requires tradeoffs, such that it may or may not make 
sense to respect them.104 The critical issue is that those designing and 
 
specific function or set of functions upon data that is passed to it, and the module then passes the 
result on to some next module for further processing (or to an output device once processing is 
complete). When designing a modular system, engineers need to consider both where to draw the 
boundary between different modules and what information needs to be passed between modules. 
These decisions are typically based on technical considerations. 
102 See Clark et al., supra note 5, at 466-68 (using the domain name system (DNS) design as 
an example to demonstrate the modularity principle). 
103 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, § C18 cmt. a & 
reporters’ note to cmt. a (2000) (“Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors for Indivisible Harm”).  
104 To give a nontechnical example, a general contractor could face liability for the poor work 
of a subcontractor, whom she may then implead if a suit results. This does not mean that she 
must, or even should, hire that subcontractor as an employee. There are reasons she may choose 
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implementing the technology understand that their design choices have legal 
implications—and that those legal implications are clear. 
C. Limitations of Endogenous Institutions 
The final institution considered in the previous Part was the use of 
endogenous institutions to “establish” trust between users. While unques-
tionably the most relied-upon mechanism today—especially in the cases of 
reputation and encryption—this approach has substantial limitations.  
Most fundamentally, relying upon third parties to a transaction to establish 
trust assumes the trustworthiness of those third parties. This makes the 
question of trust more complicated by involving more parties. Moreover, 
the greatest requirement for endogenous institutions is that they require the 
interacting parties to have no affiliation with the third parties. In a network 
in which a user cannot trust those third parties, this is a suspect assumption. 
Indeed, instances of parties influencing third-party reputational mechanisms, 
either directly or through enlisting confederates, are common.105 As the 
Internet continues to become a prominent forum for economic and social 
interactions, the incentives for third parties to manipulate endogenous 
mechanisms will increase.106 
At their core, endogenous systems have worked because the Internet 
community, as a whole, has been trustworthy. But as this trust continues to 
dissipate, the efficacy of these endogenous mechanisms almost certainly must 
fail—a conclusion supported by both Ellickson and Ostrom.107 Small 
communities are able to function as commons, with norm-based rules, 
almost precisely because they are small and have shared incentives or 
values. As they grow, they develop exogenous institutions—such as courts—
to provide redress for harms. 
Moreover, endogenous institutions may also restrict the range of uses 
that the network can support. The best example is encryption. Encryption 
relies upon a number of actors to coordinate an information exchange to 
make that information unintelligible to unauthorized intermediaries.108 This 
has the advantage of limiting the range of harm that intermediaries can 
 
such an arrangement, and reasons she may not. The critical concern is that she understand these 
tradeoffs. 
105 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
107 See ELLICKSON, supra note 81; OSTROM, supra note 81. 
108 See generally NETWORK ASSOCS., INC., supra note 83, at 30-33 (discussing various trust 
models); Gerck, supra note 4, at 24 (“Trust, as qualified reliance on information, needs multiple, 
independent channels to be communicated.”).  
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inflict upon users. The technical goal of encryption is to make any two 
pieces of data indistinguishable from each other; this, in turn, means that 
intermediaries have no basis for treating any two pieces of data differently. 
Therefore, if users are concerned about disparate treatment of their data or 
being treated disparately based upon the content of their data, encryption 
offers strong protection. 
But users may value disparate treatment of their data, both vis-à-vis 
their own data and that of other users. There is a great deal of value to be 
had, for instance, in prioritization of certain types of traffic109—indeed, 
prioritization might be necessary to make certain applications viable online, 
or it might allow them to operate far more efficiently.110 At a more basic 
level, a core value proposition of the Internet is “statistical multiplexing,” 
which allows connections to be shared among multiple users and applica-
tions.111 But firms and users will only be willing to share their connections if 
doing so does not jeopardize their own uses. A firm, for instance, might be 
willing to invest $1 billion in a network that would generate $3 billion in 
social welfare spillovers, provided that at least a third of that social benefit 
accrued to its own private interest. If this is only possible with prioritiza-
tion, then we ought to prefer such prioritization. 
Finally, recent work in economics suggests that liability is more effective 
than endogenous mechanisms such as reputation in facilitating interactions 
between untrusting parties. This follows from economic studies of credence 
goods.112 Recent empirical work shows that liability plays a crucial role in 
ensuring that parties in trust-based interactions behave in a trustworthy 
 
109 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 Geo. L.J. 1847, 
1879-83 (2006) (discussing the benefits of prioritizing traffic based on the particular application or 
content in question); Shigang Chen & Klara Nahrstedt, An Overview of Quality of Service Routing for 
Next-Generation High-Speed Networks: Problems and Solutions, IEEE NETWORK, Nov.-Dec. 1998, 
64, 64-70 (describing data flow management approaches in the context of high-quality audio-visual 
information); Bob Briscoe & Steve Rudkin, Commercial Models for IP Quality of Service 
Interconnect, 9-11 (June 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bobbriscoe.net/ 
projects/ipe2eqos/gqs/papers/ixqos_bttj05.pdf (analyzing data flow management in a scenario with 
multiple applications, each having a minimum usable rate). 
110 For example, efficient multiplexing of jitter- or delay-sensitive applications may require 
scheduled-transport, bandwidth or route reservation, or other forms of temporal multiplexing. See 
generally Wischik et al., supra note 53. Without such options, applications might rely instead on 
protocol-unfriendly alternatives. See supra note 54. 
111 See Wischik et al., supra note 53, at 48 (describing the goals and mechanisms of “statistical 
multiplexing”). 
112 Credence goods are goods whose quality is difficult to ascertain both before and after a 
consumer purchases or consumes them. For a description of credence goods, see Michael R. Darby 
& Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. & ECON. 67, 68-72 (1973). 
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manner.113 Reputation, on the other hand, is a relatively ineffective 
constraint on the behavior of untrustworthy parties—its primary effect is 
rather to encourage greater strategic behavior on the part of deceptive 
parties.114 
IV. TOWARD A POST-TRUST LAW OF INTERMEDIARIES 
The limitations seen in the mechanisms considered above provide 
guidance for moving forward. This Part offers a general framework for 
thinking about the post-trust law of intermediaries. 
Generally, it is premature to develop comprehensive legal rules to 
impose liability on intermediaries for harm they may cause—the technology 
is still evolving and the potential range of harms is ill-defined. Rather, the 
focus should be on developing a framework to understand the rules that will 
apply to the Internet architecture, however that architecture may evolve. 
This will provide engineers with a menu of legal implications that may 
follow from technical design decisions, and also helps us understand what 
any rules should look like today. The general approach is modeled after 
Calabresi and Melamed’s work on property and liability rules. It suggests 
that we should initially rely on liability rules, with burdens placed on 
intermediaries, but as technology develops, we may move towards property 
rules that place burdens on users to exercise control over their data.115 
Hopefully, these rules will help ensure that such a transition occurs. 
A. Moving Forward: The Approach and the Stakes 
Understanding what it means to move forward is challenging because of 
the limitations inherent in the network considered throughout this Article. 
It is also difficult because those limitations continue to change as the 
Internet and our uses of it evolve.  
As a starting point, it is clear that we are moving in a direction regardless 
of the availability of legal recourse against intermediaries. The status quo, 
in which intermediaries are increasingly able to use or handle user data in 
ways unsatisfactory to those users, is not a stable equilibrium. We see this with 
network neutrality and online privacy—both uses of active-intermediation 
 
113 See Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, The Economics of Credence 
Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition, 101 AM. 
ECON. REV. 526, 528 (2011) (“[O]ur results suggest that legal liability clauses are most suitable to 
cure many of the inefficiencies associated with the provision of credence goods.”). 
114 See id. at 549 (analyzing the limitation of reputational effects to control behavior).  
115 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 66, at 1106-10 (describing the difference between 
property and liability rules). 
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technology that users intuitively resist, but both developed as ways to fund 
the Internet architecture. The path that has led to these concerns can be 
understood in terms of trust: humans have a natural predisposition to trust 
machines,116 and this propensity naturally leads to acceptance of technologies 
regardless of whether they are trustworthy. But as users learn to question 
the trustworthiness of that technology, they will either move away from 
the technology or demand accountability. 
At the same time, there is ongoing concern about vertical integration 
and the turn toward appliance-like models of Internet-based devices and 
services. Jonathan Zittrain and Tim Wu both express concern about the loss 
of generativity and increasing consolidation of control over key Internet 
infrastructure—trends that push the network toward so-called “walled 
gardens.”117 Other authors, however, argue for a walled garden–like online 
experience, with walls defined by trusted relationships.118 Beyond academic 
discourse, and as shown by Zittrain and Wu, walled gardens are an increasing 
reality. For those who believe in the value of generativity, or those who 
have concerns about consolidation and insufficient competition, this suggests 
a bleak future. 
Today’s Internet is therefore poised between two equilibria: one charac-
terized by a return to a simpler Internet of passive intermediation; the other 
characterized by a future of more powerful but less generative walled 
gardens. Against this backdrop, developing mechanisms that allow users to 
seek recourse against intermediaries adds an appealing third option—one 
that would allow for the continued development of these technologies 
without having to forego generativity or cede control of the architecture to 
a walled-garden experience.  
Any framework for a law of intermediaries therefore has parallel goals. 
First, recourse must be available for users to accept active intermediation. 
But that legal remedy cannot be static—the Internet architecture is changing, 
 
116 See Camp et al., supra note 6, at 97 (“Previous research has supported the hypothesis that 
people are more trusting of computers than of other people.”). 
117 See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
260-64 (2010) (discussing the use of “walled gardens” to consolidate dominance in the Internet as 
has happened in the past with other competitive new technologies); ZITTRAIN, supra note 100, at 
29 (describing “walled gardens” using the examples of AOL and CompuServe); see also Schneier, 
supra note 100 (discussing consumers’ increased reliance on external applications, hardware, and 
Internet resources to provide security). 
118 See Johnson et al., supra note 4, at 11 (noting that “it may be possible and advisable to 
shift” to a “‘connect only with whom you trust’ model” of the Internet); see also David D. Clark & 
Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and Application Design: The Role of Trust, 63 
FED. COMM. L.J. 357, 380-83 (2010) (proposing modularization in application design to promote 
trust in networks). Fundamentally, walled gardens are a form of vertical integration. 
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and will change in response to the law. The better approach is to provide a 
framework: a menu of legal rules that will apply as the architecture changes. 
Such a framework will provide guidance both to legal institutions to which 
users might turn when they feel they have been harmed, and also to tech-
nologists and engineers as they develop and implement next-generation 
architectures.  
B. A Framework for Intermediary Liability 
In 1972, Calabresi and Melamed synthesized approaches from various 
areas of law into a coherent framework of remedies.119 Their approach 
considered two factors: which party should bear the benefit of a given 
entitlement, and what mechanism should protect that benefit.120 They 
identified two common mechanisms121: property rules and liability rules, 
which are distinguished by how clearly the entitlement can be delineated 
and valued between the parties.122 This approach provides a basic frame-
work for considering intermediary liability. 
Intuitively, it seems that a user’s data—as suggested by the very term 
“user’s data”—is property-like. This understanding is too simplistic. The 
primary characteristic of property-like rights is the right to exclude, or to 
seek an injunction precluding others from encroaching upon that right. It is 
certainly the case that users can exclude intermediaries from causing any 
harm to them by simply not engaging in online interactions. But at the time 
of the relevant interaction, the user has necessarily relinquished control of 
her data to the intermediary. We must therefore focus the inquiry on the 
rights available to that subset of individuals who have elected to subject 
their data to an architecture that does not support a property-like delineation 
of rights. 
The characteristics of the current Internet architecture—transparency 
and independence of intermediaries—militate in favor of assigning the 
benefit of the entitlement to the user but treating it under a liability rule. 
Liability rules are useful where “the cost of establishing the value . . . by 
negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the entitlement would 
 
119 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 66, at 1089-93 (summarizing their framework of 
legal entitlements and remedies). 
120 Id. at 1093. 
121 They also identify a third mechanism: inalienability rules. See id. at 1092-93 (“[R]ules of 
inalienability not only ‘protect’ the entitlement; they may also be viewed as limiting or regulating 
the grant of the entitlement itself.”). These rules, however, do not apply well in the present 
context. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1409-27 
(2009) (offering a detailed exploration of inalienability rules).  
122 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 66, at 1105. 
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benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur.”123 This is precisely the 
situation presented online. Due to the transparency and independence of 
intermediaries in the current architecture, it is implausible that either side 
could seek out the other to negotiate the terms of an intermediary’s 
handling of a user’s data. 
It is reasonable, however, to assign the benefit of the entitlement to the 
user, for two reasons. First, as a matter of traditional application of the 
Calabresi and Melamed framework, the informational asymmetries resulting 
from the transparency and independence of intermediaries suggest that the 
burden of ensuring the entitlement be put to its highest-value use falls upon 
the intermediary. Since the benefit of the use of individuals’ data must 
accrue to those individuals, this requires the intermediaries to use this data 
to the benefit of the users.124 Second, this information asymmetry exists as a 
result of design decisions in implementing the Internet architecture—that 
is, in developing and implementing the intermediaries that comprise the 
Internet’s core. The burden to protect those whom these decisions harm 
should fall upon those making such decisions. 
Importantly, this set of rules can change as the capabilities of the Internet 
architecture changes: Further, if the current set of rules is suboptimal (e.g., 
it unduly burdens intermediaries), this framework creates incentives for 
engineers to develop new technologies that increase the efficiency of the 
rules.  
For instance, these rules may encourage the development of technologies 
that give users greater control over their data; both to specify how it can or 
cannot be handled and to monitor that it is, in fact, handled in accord with 
those specifications. In such a case, the clearer delineation of rights would 
suggest placing the burden on users to ensure that their data was being 
handled in accordance with their expectations, and to refuse to deal with 
intermediaries that would not adhere to those expectations. This would 
mark a transition toward property rules; accordingly, the burden of ensuring 
the efficient use of the entitlement would be placed on the users.125 
We can see how this framework would play out as new technologies 
develop. For instance, users today cannot specify whether their data is 
handled by routers and switches implementing deep packet inspection or 
quality-of-service technologies, let alone monitor whether such preferences 
 
123 Id. at 1106. 
124 This is true of even the subset of users who have given control over their data to inter-
mediaries; they would not have done so unless it was beneficial to them. 
125 That is, in the event of a lawsuit, the entitlement would favor the intermediary, unless the 
user could prove harm. 
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are respected.126 Under the framework’s approach, users concerned about 
whether their data is being unduly deprioritized by any of a group of 
intermediaries should be able to bring a lawsuit against that group as a 
whole.127 The burden would be on the intermediaries to demonstrate that 
that they handled the user’s data in a manner consistent with the user’s 
interests, as best as the intermediary could discern them to be. 
In response, mechanisms foreseeably could be developed to allow users 
to specify whether they want, or are willing to allow, their data to be subject 
to prioritization. In fact, technical mechanisms allowing this specification 
are already being developed.128 As such mechanisms become available and 
robust, we should expect the burden to shift: once users can express expec-
tations for how their data will be handled, they should use that capability. 
Failure to do so would give rise to a reasonable inference that those users 
are not sufficiently concerned about how their data is handled to justify 
damages.  
Another example can be found in the evolving “do not track” standard,129 
the purpose of which is to allow users to specify whether they want web 
intermediaries to track their online activity. In a world without this 
technology—that is, as the world exists today—we should expect liability 
rules with burdens placed upon intermediaries to protect, and to prove that 
they have protected, the entitlement.130 But as web browsers implement “do 
not track,” allowing for a clearer delineation of rights, we should transition 
 
126 They have limited ability to specify a QoS preference, the meaning of which is ambiguous 
and not consistently used. 
127 For an example of such a lawsuit, see generally First Amended Class Action Complaint, 
Hart v. Comcast, No. 07-6350 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2008), 2008 WL 5185811. In that instance, 
because there was privity and express terms of service, users were able to file a suit (which resulted 
in a class action settlement), including under California consumer protection laws. Such a suit, 
however, would not have been possible against any intermediaries other than the consumers’ ISP, 
due to lack of a contractual relationship.  
128 Such mechanisms could be incorporated into the network layer via the IP header, or at 
the transport layer, perhaps as part of the RSVP protocol. See generally R. Braden et al., Resource 
ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 2205, 1997), available at 
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc2205.txt.pdf (outlining the specifications for RSVP, a 
protocol that allows users to request specific resources for, or handling of, their data as it traverses 
the Internet). 
129 See Do Not Track-Universal Web Tracking Opt Out, DO NOT TRACK, http://donottrack.us 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (describing the “do not track” proposal, which would provide users with 
“a single, simple, persistent choice to opt out of third-party web tracking” via an HTTP header). 
130 Thus, we might expect to find no liability if an intermediary shares information needed to 
generate advertising revenue commensurate with the price it would charge the user for access to 
the site; however, we would find liability if the intermediary indiscriminately shared this 
information or shared more information than was needed to generate sufficient advertising 
revenue. 
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to a property-like rule with burdens placed on the user to make use of “do 
not track” technology.  
Calabresi and Melamed present an argument that, at first blush, can be 
understood as opposing the treatment of “do not track” headers under a 
property rule. They use hold-out and free-riding problems as examples of 
situations in which liability rules are preferable to property rules. Under an 
advertisement-supported model, “do not track” can support free-riding 
behaviors: users could refuse to share their information with targeted 
advertisers while benefiting from the services funded by others who have 
shared such information. But so long as web sites are able to treat users 
differently based upon the content of the users’ “do not track” preferences, 
there is no free-riding problem. To the contrary, a website confronted with 
a “do not track” user confronts the perfect opportunity to engage in the 
voluntary transactions that define property rules. The site needs only to 
present “do not track” users with a blank page explaining that the site is 
funded by either advertising or subscription revenue, and present the user 
with a set of choices: allow tracking, make a direct payment to the website, 
or take her web-browsing business elsewhere. 
C. Some Specifics 
This framework presents specific recommendations to facilitate online 
interactions on today’s Internet. But it is unwise to develop comprehensive 
rules only for the current architecture—the Internet’s architecture is still 
evolving and does not yet present a stable institutional equilibrium. Any 
rules we adopt today will likely be obsolete all too soon. Indeed, the greater 
purpose of these recommendations is to hasten the architecture’s movement 
toward a stable institutional equilibrium. 
The most important task might be to establish the possibility of inter-
mediary liability on today’s Internet. Unfortunately, a number of obstacles 
stand in the way. First, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 has long stood for a broad proposition of immunity for intermediaries.131 
It is unclear—and hopefully unlikely—that courts would apply the statute 
so broadly as to encompass the broad class of intermediaries considered in 
this Article.132 Regardless, an important justification for this statute—the 
 
131 See Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509, § 230(c)(1), 110 Stat. 133, 138 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006)) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”). 
132 Courts have consistently interpreted the Communications Decency Act broadly, almost 
certainly beyond the boundaries contemplated by Congress. See David Lukmire, Can the Courts 
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need to provide for the Internet to develop unfettered by investment-
stifling regulation—is no longer relevant in the current architecture. This 
section is as outdated as its justification, so it should (at minimum) be 
updated.  
Indeed, where intermediaries once needed immunity to encourage 
development, today the prospect of liability may more effectively encourage 
development. We are beyond the point where the goal is simply to make 
the Internet work; today, our goal should be to make it work well. Too 
often, we have been slow to deploy well-designed technologies, instead 
allowing ourselves to be satisfied with good-enough technologies until the 
system breaks. Engineers have recognized the benefits of AQM for twenty 
years, but today only the simplest forms of this technology have been 
implemented to any significant extent.133 The same can be said of IPv6: first 
developed in the late 1990s, it is only just now beginning to be deployed 
seriously. Similarly, security has too often been an afterthought, even in the 
face of known dangers.134 Immunity-based approaches, if anything, encourage 
the development of technologies whose value accrues to the intermediaries 
and discourage the development of technologies whose benefits accrue 
primarily to users. Liability rules reverse the effects of these incentives. 
These considerations suggest a second recommendation: the statutory 
immunity regime should give way to statutory liability rules. The difficulty 
of establishing and measuring harm and the limitations of existing causes of 
action suggest a need for statutorily cognizable damages. The precise target 
or level of damages is less important than their mere existence. Perhaps the 
solution is as simple as allowing statutory cost-shifting in favor of plaintiffs 
who bring reasonable claims. The primary goal of this approach is to 
encourage the development and use of technologies that give users control 
of their online interactions. 
Third, courts should recognize broad joint and several liability, both as 
part of a liability rule and as an information-forcing mechanism to ensure 
that intermediaries handle information to the benefit of users.  
 
Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 372 (2010) (“Over the years, state and federal courts have interpreted 
section 230 expansively, conferring a broad immunity upon website operators that host third-party 
content.”). 
133 See, e.g., B. Braden et al., Recommendations on Queue Management and Congestion Avoidance in 
the Internet (IETF Network Working Grp. RFC No. 2309, 1998), available at http://tools.ietf.org/ 
pdf/rfc2309.pdf (describing AQM as providing “[t]he solution to the full-queues problem . . . [because 
it allows] routers to drop packets before a queue becomes full, so that end nodes can respond to 
congestion before buffers overflow”). 
134 See supra note 9. 
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Finally, regulatory intervention should be sought only as a backstop 
when private causes of action fail. Regulation likely has a role to play in 
many types of online interaction, but it is a heavy hand upon a delicate 
technology. Regulation lacks the nuance of voluntary negotiations between 
parties—it is the ultimate liability rule. As demonstrated by “do not track,” 
technology can facilitate voluntary interactions between parties subject to 
property-like rules. Regulation should be careful to encourage, not stifle, 
such innovation.  
CONCLUSION 
The early model of the Internet—a relatively simple network that was 
designed, constructed, and used by a relatively small community of research 
and governmental institutions, with broadly aligned incentives—is a thing 
of the past. In that early iteration, trust was a sufficient mechanism to order 
online interactions. But as the range of uses and users has grown, and as 
incentives have diversified, there is and will continue to be an increasing 
need for more sophisticated mechanisms to mediate these conflicting 
incentives. 
This Article has looked at one set of conflicting incentives—that 
between users and intermediaries—and has considered users’ need to hold 
intermediaries accountable for any harm that they may cause to users. 
Historically, this has not been a relevant consideration, both because the 
technology has been simple enough (i.e., passive) that intermediaries have 
had limited ability to cause individualized harm, and because intermediaries 
and users had aligned incentives. But this is no longer the case.  
The challenge moving forward is that the technological design principles 
of the Internet—the very things that give the Internet its character and 
have allowed it to thrive—also make establishing liability for intermediaries 
difficult. By design, intermediaries are supposed to operate transparently 
and independently. Users are not supposed to, or even be able to, directly 
observe how intermediaries operate, control which intermediaries are used 
in their online interactions, or even know which intermediaries these are. 
These technological principles make establishing liability difficult, if not 
impossible. 
This is worrisome because the Internet is still evolving, and it is unclear 
how it will continue to develop. Three possibilities present themselves. 
First, the Internet could return to its earlier passive-intermediary model. 
This is largely the world advanced by advocates of network neutrality and 
broad privacy protections. Though a move backward in technological time, 
and one that would limit value created by active intermediation, this option 
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may be preferable to the second alternative: increased vertical integration 
between intermediaries. This approach would reduce the number of inter-
mediaries, thereby making intermediary liability easier to establish. But it 
would also reduce the range of uses available to Internet users. In Zittrain’s 
language, it would limit the generative nature of the Internet, moving us 
further toward a walled-garden model.135 While integrated intermediaries 
would likely maximize specific, highest-value uses of the Internet, they 
would do so at the expense of the myriad low- and uncertain-value uses that 
have made the Internet such a fertile platform for innovation. 
Intermediary liability presents, and is a necessary condition for, a third 
option: a network of active intermediaries accountable to users. This 
approach allows for value-creating active intermediation, but constrains 
intermediaries from using active technologies contrary to users’ interests.  
The challenge lies in establishing intermediary liability, especially given 
the technological limitations created by transparency and independence. 
This Article has suggested a framework for establishing such liability, 
modeled on Calebresi and Melamed’s model of liability and property rules. 
Under this framework, today’s intermediaries would be governed by broad 
liability rules with burdens placed on the intermediaries themselves to 
prove that they have not harmed users. But, as technology develops, it may 
give users greater control over how their data is used, a shift that this 
framework hopefully encourages. In the case that technological advances do 
provide such increased control, intermediaries would be better governed by 
property rules with burdens placed on users to exercise control over their 
data. Such an approach would present engineers with a menu of options, so 
that they may understand the legal consequences that follow from technical 
design decisions. 
Fundamentally, this menu approach helps to align the incentives of 
engineers and those of the law. Historically, the Internet was developed to 
accomplish technical objectives, with little consideration of the legal 
ramifications of technological decisions. Given the uncertainty of the 
underlying technology, this was a reasonable approach. But the Internet is 
now an established social and economic infrastructure, and legal concerns 
need to be incorporated into its ongoing development. By adopting a 
framework rather than trying to develop specific legal rules, this Article 
hopefully provides guidance to technologists for understanding the legal 
consequences of their technological decisions, so that they can balance 
technical and legal considerations. 
 
135 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 100.  
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On the legal side of the equation, this Article raises the prospect of 
imposing liability on intermediaries. Establishing such liability is difficult 
under current law: neither common law nor statutory law is well-suited to 
the task. Nonetheless, such liability is important to the continued vitality of 
the evolving Internet. It is important that we understand how the law may 
apply vis-à-vis users and intermediaries. This Article therefore makes a 
number of discrete proposals, with the overarching purpose of channeling 
the ongoing technological development of the Internet along a path that 
will normalize the availability of legal recourse for online interactions with 
that of other legal institutions. As particular examples, this Article argues 
that section 230 should be revised to clarify (and narrow) the extent of 
intermediary immunity provisions; statutory liability rules should be used 
to augment existing rules where the Internet’s architecture may limit the 
viability of civil recourse; and civil courts should broadly embrace joint and 
several liability, and similar rules, both to ensure the availability of civil 
recourse to individuals harmed by intermediaries and to encourage the 
development of future technologies that better facilitate intermediary 
liability.  
 
 
 
 
